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Abstract: The Pakistan Army is a politically important organization, yet its opacity has hindered 
academic research. We use open sources to construct unique new data on the backgrounds, 
careers, and post-retirement activities of post-1971 Corps Commanders and Directors-General of 
Inter-Services Intelligence. We provide evidence of bureaucratic predictability and 
professionalism while officers are in service. After retirement, we show little involvement in 
electoral politics but extensive involvement in military-linked corporations, state employment, 
and other positions of influence. This combination provides Pakistan’s military with an unusual 
blend of professional discipline internally and political power externally - even when not directly 
ruling. 
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Pakistan’s army is central to questions of local, regional, and global stability. We investigate the 
organizational politics of the Pakistan Army using unique individual-level data on the corps 
commanders of the Army and Directors-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since 1971. 
The corps commanders are of enormous importance, working with the Chief of Army Staff 
(COAS) to launch coups, withdraw from power, forge external and internal security policies, and 
shape the politics of Pakistan.1 We gathered data from open sources on the personal and career 
backgrounds of the corps commanders and ISI directors-general, their trajectories within the 
military, and what they did in retirement, both immediately after leaving service and later in 
retirement. These data provide systematic, detailed information on the military’s elite personnel 
and, crucially, how it has managed to keep them largely on board with a complex, politically 
demanding project. The data have numerous, important limitations – but they are also, to the best 
of our knowledge, unique in the Pakistani case, and among a small number of similar studies 
world-wide.3 
We first show strong evidence of high levels of bureaucratic institutionalization and 
professionalism within the Pakistan Army. Despite its recurrent praetorianism and ongoing 
political influence, the rules within the organization seem to be generally followed, with limited 
factionalism and consistent promotion pathways. There is the stark contrast between this 
rational-bureaucratic organization and other political militaries, like those in Thailand, 1970s 
Bangladesh, 1960s Nigeria, or 1990s Indonesia, racked by internal fratricide, plagued by 
factional rivalries, or vulnerable to divide-and-rule strategies by ruling elites.  
                                                
1 This includes the nine standard corps, plus Army Air Defence and Army Strategic Forces Command. This comes 
to 183 officers over 45 years. There have been 18 DG’s ISI, of whom a number were also corps commanders. 
3 For other similar studies, see Lee and Laksmana 2017, Nakanishi 2013, Poczter and Pepinsky 2016, and Kammen 
and Chandra 2010. The paper from this paper will be available upon publication.  
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We then provide unique data on the retirement of the corps commanders. We show a 
clearly institutionalized transmission belt that shifts retired elites into military-owned charitable 
foundations and affiliated corporations, specific posts in the civilian government, and other 
positions of real and/or symbolic authority. These positions of influence, in addition to generous 
pensions and other benefits provided to retired generals, provide powerful incentives to toe the 
organizational line while serving, and to avoid directly participating in politics after retirement. 
Importantly, these “off-ramps” are centrally controlled by the high command.  
Strikingly few retired corps commanders go into electoral politics, and most only join the 
private sector late in retirement (often working for multinationals). Of the data we have, over 60 
percent of corps commanders’ first post-retirement positions are in the service of the state. As 
they move deeper into retirement, more tentative data suggests greater involvement in the private 
sector and civil society, but still little direct embrace of electoral politics.  
Internal bureaucratic discipline fused with the continued cooperation of elites even after 
they retire are crucial to the military’s professional cohesion and its high levels of power within 
Pakistani society. This distinctive combination has allowed the Pakistan Army remarkable 
influence over key areas of national policy - even when it does not directly rule the country. 
Standard theories of military professionalism and praetorianism may miss the crucial coexistence 
of internal professionalism and external politicization.4 Our evidence on deep continuities over 
time also shows that distinguishing between military and civilian rule can be very difficult: the 
end of formal military rule may not usher in civilian control of key areas of national policy.5 We 
                                                
4 Cf. Huntington 1967. Finer 1962, Barany 2012 make similar arguments.  
5 Major efforts to distinguish democracy and dictatorship, as well as variants of authoritarianism, include Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz 2014, Svolik 2012, and Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013. 
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conclude by identifying new directions for research on Pakistan’s military, and military politics 
more broadly.  
New Evidence on Pakistan’s Army 
Our approach differs from the existing literature on the Pakistani security state in two ways. 
First, extant work is dominated by macro-historical narratives.6 These are excellent and 
important. But without further access to the military’s archives, there are serious limitations to 
conducting further research of this kind. Adjudicating among existing narrative accounts is 
difficult without further access to primary evidence. Some scholars are able to conduct 
interviews with current and former military officers, but access is uneven and restricted, the 
results are often contradictory, and the data are only helpful for certain research questions.7 
Reliance on the military’s publications has many of the same limitations. 
Second, Pakistan is almost always compared to India. India is the praetorian road not 
taken, the historically-similar matched pair that followed a more appropriately “objective 
control” model of the military and politics.8 This is a helpful comparison for the first decade of 
South Asia’s post-colonial history. But after the 1958 coup, or even as early as the entry of 
General Ayub Khan into the civilian cabinet in 1954, the comparison loses value. To understand 
the origins of Pakistan’s military politics, comparative analysis with India is essential; beyond 
that, it devolves into an apples and oranges comparison. Instead, we look within the military’s 
organization to generate new insights into its functioning.  
Micro-Data on Pakistan’s Military Elite 
                                                
6 Cohen 1998, Fair 2014a, Shah 2014, Wilkinson 2015, Siddiqa 2007, Cloughley 2008, Nawaz 2008, Rizvi 2000. 
7 For instance, Ahmed 2013 and Schofield 2011. 
8 Staniland 2008, Wilkinson 2015, Tudor 2013. 
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We used open sources to gather data on soldiers who became corps commander from 1971 
onward. We also gathered the same data for the DGs of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
some of whom never became a corps commander, providing a small complementary dataset. 
This is, to the best of our knowledge, unique public data.10 The top position in the Army, Chief 
of Army Staff (COAS), presides over a tight pyramid of control. Technically, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) is a higher position with jurisdiction over all three 
services, but in reality CJCSC is fairly powerless, and mainly a way for worthy senior officers to 
achieve a fourth star before retirement.11 Below the COAS are General Headquarters (GHQ) 
staff positions, combat commands at the corps and division level, positions heading military 
academies, and a variety of other postings, from running ordnance factories to staffing UN 
peacekeeping missions. The corps commanders are the collective elite who work with the COAS 
to manage this sprawling military establishment. 
We used internet resources, journalistic coverage, government documents, and published 
secondary sources to gather data on the corps commanders through February 2017. These ranged 
from newspaper articles to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press releases to annual 
reports of military-affiliated corporations to Wikipedia (with cross-checking). We created 
individual documents for each officer, which vary in quality and extent because of variation in 
the amount of data available, with coding and sources to provide maximum transparency. In 
addition to the dataset, these materials will be made publicly available, which will help improve 
their quality over time. We focused on the post-1971 period because data was more readily 
available and this time frame allowed us to examine three periods of civilian rule (1972-77, 
                                                
10 For an important exception, see Fair and Nawaz 2011 on district-level recruitment patterns and Fair 2014b, who 
combines these data with household surveys.  
11 Occasionally, if rarely, air marshals or admirals are appointed CJCJC.   
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1988-1999, 2008-present) and two periods of military rule (Zia, 1977-1988 and Musharraf, 
1999-2008).  
The unit of analysis is the individual officer who became a corps commander or DG ISI 
in or after 1971. The definition of corps commander we adopt is broader than just the nine 
“standard” combat corps: we include Army Air Defence Command and Army Strategic Forces 
Command. We assigned each individual a unique ID, since some individuals had multiple 
commands of a corps and/or the ISI, which would lead to replication of the same individual data 
if the command was the unit of analysis. We ended up with a Corps Commander dataset of 183 
officers and an ISI dataset of 18 officers. Eighteen of these officers were still serving as of 
February 2017, but the vast majority are retired. Two former corps commanders died while 
serving, both as COAS: Asif Nawaz in 1993 and Zia ul Haq in 1988. Two former DGs ISI died 
while in service, Akhtar Abdur Rahman – in the same plane crash as Zia while CJCSC – and 
Major General Riaz Hussain.  
The main challenge we faced was data availability. As we discuss below, for some 
variables there is very extensive missing data. We transparently identify particularly problematic 
cases and the conclusions we can credibly draw, and these are a focus of our future empirical 
work. There are also issues of data quality, since sourcing can be very difficult. By providing 
sourcing information and transparently producing the data upon publication, we hope that 
mistakes can be corrected and gaps filled in as part of a cumulative process. We hope that this 
effort can help to further advance the collection of systematic qualitative and quantitative data on 
Pakistan’s military.13  
Becoming a Corps Commander: Bureaucratic Predictability   
                                                
13 Excellent recent work in this vein includes Siddiqa 2007, Nawaz 2008, Fair and Nawaz 2011, Fair 2014, Shah 
2014, and Wilkinson 2015.  
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We first discuss pre-corps command characteristics of the corps commanders in our sample. We 
separate DG ISI analysis for a distinct section later in the paper. Our main conclusion is that the 
Pakistan Army, consistent with extant accounts, is a highly professionalized and bureaucratized 
organization, showing substantial continuities along a range of outcomes. There are some 
exceptions, mainly surrounding the top commanders in periods of military rule or extreme 
political instability, but there is little evidence of the pervasive factionalism that has plagued 
many other political militaries. While there is a baseline level of friction within the organization 
on particular decisions, especially concerning the wide latitude army chiefs have to choose corps 
commanders, by and large, the Pakistan army does not see splits either among top commanders 
or between commanders and the ranks. This is not a given: as Geddes has argued, and cases like 
Thailand highlight, political militaries often fracture among factions and personalities.14 Thus 
Pakistan stands out for its cohesion in comparative perspective, in line with militaries in Egypt, 
Myanmar, and pre-Erdogan Turkey.15 
Demographic and Education Characteristics 
Where are the eventual corps commanders from? These were the most difficult variables, by far, 
for us to gather and thus any findings are highly caveated.  87 of 183 observations are missing, 
but of the sample, 55 percent were born in Punjab and 21 percent in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK). Only 3 percent of our sample were born in Sindh, 3 percent in Azad Kashmir, and 2 
percent in Balochistan. KPK is thus moderately over-represented while Sindh is very heavily 
under-represented, affecting both Muhajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India at Partition) and 
Sindhis. Earlier generations of officers had substantial numbers born in present-day India, but 
this cohort has obviously diminished dramatically. While missing data is a massive problem, this 
                                                
14 Geddes 1999. On the Thai military, see Chambers 2014. 
15 Cook 2007, Nakanishi 2013. 
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basic finding aligns entirely with all other accounts of the demographics of the Army.16 Given 
that we expect better data on more prominent officers, this further suggests that these provinces 
contribute the bulk of the military elite.  
This also provide insight into ethnicity, a variable we also struggled to code. Though not 
everyone born in Punjab is Punjabi or in KPK is Pashtun, it is highly suggestive. We also explore 
how these dynamics have shifted as India-born, Urdu-speaking officers move from the scene. Of 
officers whose first corps command came after 2004, 61 percent are from Punjab, 18 percent 
from KPK, and 7 percent from Sindh. This suggests a tilt toward Punjab and continued Sindhi 
under-representation at the highest levels of the military, which aligns with the findings of Fair 
and Nawaz (2011) that showed Sindhi under-representation and over-representation from KPK 
in recruitment. They identify something of an increase over time from Sindh, however, which 
may eventually translate into representation in the military elite.  Similarly, the military has made 
recent efforts to increase recruitment from Balochistan; they will reach senior ranks in a decade.  
 What is the distribution of taking the first corps command over time? Figure 1 shows the 
incidence of first commands by year. There are some obvious periods of instability that lead to 
reshuffling – 2001-2 as Musharraf tried to bring the Army under tighter control in the face of 
American pressure, the late Zia years, and the last years of Musharraf’s rule (2005-2007). All 
army chiefs are extended some latitude to form their own “management team” upon ascending to 
the position, though from a pool of two- and three-star generals that is relatively fixed. In 
addition, the elevation to army chief of a general who has officers senior to him will lead to their 
premature retirement, thus opening three star positions. The one spike fitting none of these 
                                                
16 Fair and Nawaz 2011.  
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categories – around 2010 – is an idiosyncratic result driven by General Kayani being granted an 
extension, which forced multiple retirements and a reshuffling among the corps commanders.  
Figure 1. Distribution of first corps commands by year 
 
Fair and Nawaz identify an expansion of Pakistan Military Academy-Kakul (PMA) intakes in the 
1980s17, resulting in a general increase in the size of the candidate pool, thereby necessitating 
more and quicker reshuffles. Quicker reshuffles can also be a symptom of greater politicization 
and favoritism at the very top of the pyramid. As we discuss in the second half of the paper, 
experience as a corps commander – as a position of recognized leadership – can serve as a boon 
to future career options, within and outside the military. An army chief may thus seek to reward 
loyalists with this status, however briefly. Consistent with this view of such positions as a 
leadership credential, we find that the on average, the length of time spent in command of a 
                                                
17 Fair and Nawaz 2011. 
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corps has reduced significantly over the last few decades (Figure 2). The typical officer 
beginning command of a corps in the 2010s spends barely half of the time (18 vs 33 months) in 
such a position relative to their predecessors in the 1980s. Tellingly, of the nine officers who 
spent less than a year commanding a corps, eight assumed command after 2001.  
Figure 2. Time Commanding Corps over Time 
 
We have plausible evidence of the beginning of military service for 133 of 183 corps 
commanders. Figure 3 shows when future corps commanders begin their service. Because of 
missing data, this may not be representative, particularly of those who ascended before 1998. If 
correct, though, the spike in the sample around 1971 is striking. Two explanations are possible 
for why these PMA classes did so well. First, 1971 would have produced the lieutenants who 
entered the military at its nadir after the loss of East Pakistan, uniquely positioned to advance as 
a regenerative force. Second, they entered corps command eligibility in the Musharraf years, 
when the COAS needed political support. His ISI chief and future two-term COAS, Ashfaq 
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Pervez Kayani, graduated from the PMA in 1971. Handing out promotions to this cohort may 
have been a way of maintaining internal support, especially in the tumultuous 2005-7 period of 
insurgency and popular unrest.  
Figure 3. Year of entry into military service 
 
How long does it take to become a corps commander? We use the year of service 
beginning outlined above and the year of the first command to estimate the amount of time in the 
military before commanders reach a corps command. Of the 133 officers with data on this 
variable in the sample, they average 33 years in service prior to first corps command, meaning 
they take this command around 53-55 years old. As we see in Figure 4, notwithstanding outliers 
in each direction, most corps commanders take command around the same time in their lives and 
careers. The time to first command in the sample is 31.3 years for corps commanders who left 
service before 2000 and 33.7 for those who have retired since. If this is right, it may mean that 
the growing number of officers over time competing for slots, as shown in Fair and Nawaz, is 
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delaying promotion, pushing careers backward compared to the 1980s and 1990s.18 With the 
average lieutenant-general retiring at 57-58, it is little surprise that this is the last posting for the 
plurality of corps commanders. This is also why a difference of a couple of years in time to first 
corps command is potentially meaningful: taking command at 56 means an officer is at 
retirement age upon its completion, while taking command at 54 opens the possibility for one or 
more postings before retirement.  
The general clustering of the retirement age suggests an institutionalized organization. In 
personalized or factionalized militaries, we would expect much higher variance, with favored 
officers – the son-in-law of the dictator, members of the dominant faction – being promoted early 
and often. The average time to first corps command of those officers who became Army Chief 
was 31.5 years, with 28 being the fastest (the ill-fated Khwaja Ziauddin) and 35 the oldest (the 
current COAS, Qamar Javed Bajwa). The relative youth of even the highest commanders at 
retirement puts a premium on what to do these elites after they formally leave military service.  
Figure 4. Time to first corps command 
 
                                                
18 Fair and Nawaz 2011. 
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Military Pathways to Initial Corps Command 
This section considers the military characteristics of the corps commanders. As noted already, 
our lack of a comparison pool of officers who were not selected for corps command limits 
inferences we can draw, but the strict pyramidal structure of the military, particularly the fact 
that key staff positions are fixed and can only be filled by one person at a time, does at least 
somewhat mitigate these concerns. Though similarly qualified with respect to skill set and talent, 
there are likely to be very few individuals who are identically-positioned with respect to 
experience and specific postings at any given point in time.  
 The Pakistan Army is dominated by the infantry. We have data on the sub-branch 
affiliation of the corps commanders for 151 out of 183 cases. Within these cases, 66 percent are 
from the infantry, 15 percent from armor, 14 percent from artillery, and less than 5 percent from 
engineering or from air defense. This blend has not dramatically changed over time. Table 1 
shows the sub-branch composition, estimating the proportion of officers departing service in four 
time periods by sub-branch. There is not much of a trend, beyond an apparent decline in artillery 
representation at the highest levels, and some variation in armor. Engineering and air defence 
are, unsurprisingly, marginal among the elite. This is an infantry army, and eight of ten army 
chiefs came up through the infantry according to our data.  
Table 1. Sub-Branch Percentages of Corps Commanders (Periodized by Service End) 
Period  Infantry Artillery Armour Engineering AAD 
1974-1988 
(N=20) 
55 25 15 5 0 
1989-1999 
(N=29) 
76 3 14 7 0 
2000-2007 
(N=33) 
61 12 21 0 0 
2008-2017 
(N=52) 
69 15 8 4 4 
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Currently serving 
(N=17) 
65 6 24 0 6 
 
 Our data on education suffer from severe limitations. With this caveat, we find that 74 
out of the 183 corps commanders received some sort of foreign training, meaning that at least 40 
percent of the command elite have been exposed to international military experiences. 105 have 
at least a Bachelor’s degree, and at least 96 have a Master’s degree; chances are that the real 
proportion is higher. This is consistent with a professional military that educates its elite, 
especially in the last two decades, a period which has seen a greater emphasis on senior officers 
attaining post-graduate degrees.  
 We next examine the types of jobs held by officers just prior to their first corps 
command. Here we present the general categories, and then examine more specific positions. We 
have data for 150 out of 183 officers. Table 2 presents the overall distribution of posts held prior 
to the first command. 
Table 2. Pre-First Corps Command Posts 
Pre-First Corps Command Frequency Proportion 
GHQ Position 65 43.33 
GOC, Combat Unit 29 19.33 
Head of Army School 23 15.33 
ISI Position 10 6.67 
IG, Frontier Corps 7 4.67 
DG, Rangers 5 3.33 
Head of Govt. Agency 4 2.67 
Commander, UN Mission 3 2.00 
Martial Law Administrator 2 1.33 
Defense Attache 1 0.67 
Head of Army Organization 1 0.67 
Total 150 100 
 
 The primary category of posting prior to the corps command is a staff position at General 
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Headquarters (GHQ). The second most common is being a General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
of a combat unit – usually a division such as those at Bahawalpur, Murree, Multan, Sialkot, 
Okara, or Kharian – but also units like the commando Special Service Group (SSG), or Force 
Command Northern Areas (FCNA). Following these two core pathways, we see leading a 
military school (the PMA, Command Staff College Quetta, National Defence University), having 
a position in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and serving with the Frontier Corps or Rangers, the 
main paramilitary forces. Corps commanders are coming up through the pathways we would 
expect from a professional military organization, after serving for a long period of time.  
 Specific jobs prior to a command are numerous, and widely spread across 
responsibilities. Within the GHQ staff positions, the most common jumping-off points to a 
command are Adjutant General (N=10), military secretary (N=7), Vice Chief of General Staff 
(VCGS; N=7), and Chief of General Staff (N=6). Interestingly, leading PMA (N=7), NDU 
(N=6), and Command and Staff College (N=7) are also common steps to becoming a corps 
commander: though none of these are important operational/political positions, this suggests the 
importance of education within the army. Other positions have become more important over 
time: DG Rangers and IG Frontier Corps were once considered bureaucratic backwaters and 
represented the end of one’s career, but today are considered important assignments after 
counter-insurgency operations gained prominence in the 2000s.  
 There does appear, tentatively, to be some shift in the composition of these pathways, 
with a greater reliance over time on staff and educational assignments directly prior to corps 
command. As Table 3 shows, of the 54 officers who left service in or prior to 2000 about whom 
we have prior command data, 35 percent held a GHQ staff position, 33 percent held a combat 
formation command, and 15 percent commanded an army school. By contrast, of the 96 retirees 
	 16	
after 2000, GHQ positions accounted for 48 percent of pre-corps positions, heads of army 
schools for 16 percent, and a combat formation command for only 11 percent. The importance of 
attaining a GHQ position seems to have shifted over time fairly dramatically since the mid-
1980s. Of the 24 individuals who attained a non-ISI command post prior to 1984 for whom we 
have data, only two had previously held a GHQ position; by contrast, of the 130 individuals for 
whom we have data who became a corps commander after 1984, 60 (46 percent) held a GHQ 
posting. Only one-third as many officers were jumping directly from a combat unit into a corps 
command after 2000. While missing data remains a major concern, we know everyone who has 
commanded PMA, CSC Quetta, and NDU, which means we are at least not missing military 
education commandants in the earlier period. Of the command elite as of February 2017, there is 
a mixed picture in between these extremes.  
Table 3. Patterns in Pre-Corps Command Roles over Time (percentages) 
Period GHQ GOC Army 
School 
ISI Rangers FC 
Left service 
before 2001 
(N=54) 
35 33 15 2 2 6 
Left service 
2001-2017 
(N=96) 
48 11 16 9 4 4 
Presently in 
service (N=17) 
41 23.5 23.5 6 0 6 
 
If there is in fact a trend, this suggests a more layered, bureaucratized promotion pathway 
over time, with greater emphasis on staff and educational leadership experience. A growing, 
increasingly complex military may require more of the skills that such positions demand, rather 
than just battlefield experience. Many major-generals have experience in command; their ability 
to handle other types of tasks may further differentiate them. Or this may also be a way to 
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manage a growing set of potential elites, due to an increase in officer intake in the 1980s, while 
the number of senior corps commands remains fairly static. As noted above, there is tentative 
evidence that officers have to wait longer to get a corps command than previously, and cycling 
through staff and academy slots may be one way they spend this time. This may have been a 
particular issue in the late Musharraf years, when 1971 graduates received a striking number of 
commands at a time of political tumult and escalating domestic insurgency. Time at headquarters 
or at the academies also separates field commanders from trusted subordinate officers, which is 
useful for internal coup-proofing. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that the Pakistan Army is a highly bureaucratic 
organization with quite routinized, institutionalized, and professionally-relevant pathways to the 
top. There does not appear to be the wild factionalism, personalization, or weak 
institutionalization of some other highly political militaries: the wars in the streets among the 
1980s Armed Forces of the Philippines and palace intrigues of Royal Thai Army factions are 
missing.22 Though the very top of the ladder, selection to corps commander, sees room for 
personal preferences with the army chief enjoying considerable latitude, most rungs below the 
highest echelons follow a systematic and predictable path. Employing a routinized meritocratic 
system has the benefit of minimizing internal disagreements and grievances, an important 
consideration for an organization intensely conscious of its public image as unified and cohesive. 
The only evidence of the academy year-based preference we can find involves the 1971 
graduates, but even this has multiple possible interpretations. These data do not radically change 
the conventional understanding of the Pakistan Army, but they do provide greater detail and 
                                                
22 See McCoy 1997 on the AFP and Chambers 2014 on the RTA. 
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clearer insights about trends over time. We now explore what happens to individuals once they 
have made it into the elite ranks.  
After the First Corps Command 
For most of the Pakistani military elite, their first corps command is their last major command 
(Figure 5). Of the 140 corps commanders for whom we have reliable end-of-service dates, we 
find that 43 percent leave service the year that their first command ends, 11 percent the year after 
it ends, and 16 percent two years after the end of their first corps command. The average is 1.67 
years from the end of the first corps command to the end of service. Only 15 percent make it to 
three years, and then only a few beyond that. The three key outliers are Zia ul Haq (twelve years, 
then death in plane crash), Pervez Musharraf (nine years, “retired” by being pushed out of 
power), and Ashfaq Pervez Kayani (nine years, retired). The first two were military dictators; the 
third was DG ISI from 2004-2007 under Musharraf, then COAS during the volatile years of 
2007-2013. That these are the outliers is reassuring for data quality – we are not getting random 
individuals being coded as being in service for a decade longer than average for unclear reasons. 
Figure 5. Time from end of first corps to end of service
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  We also have estimated ages at retirement. In the cases where we lack a confirmed end 
of service date, we assume that on average corps commanders retire two years after the end of 
their first command and compare that to the date of service entry for the cases in which we have 
that data. The mean of the 120 cases we can make this calculation for is 57.8 years. Depending 
on the specifics of the rank and the assignment, retirement age for corps commanders ranges 
from 57 to 60 years, not including individual extensions granted by the government. Figure 6 
provides the distribution of end of service ages. Two of these are deaths in service – army chief 
Asif Nawaz (57) and President/COAS Zia ul Haq (64) – the rest are actual retirements. The list 
of oldest leavers of service is topped by Zia, Musharraf, and Kayani, who we will see again 
below as having the longest gaps between end of first corps command and end of service.23  
Figure 6. Estimated end-of-service ages of corps commanders 
 
                                                
23 If our age estimates are basically right, it is noticeable that of the ten other elites who retired after 60 years of age, 
six took on their first command between 2004 and 2011, during the chaos of the post-9/11 wars and political 
transitions. 
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There is a minor difference in time from end of first corps to command to end of service 
between those who ended service in or before 2000 (1.9 years) and those who left service after 
2000 (1.52 years). This is barely suggestive, but, along with the evidence of a somewhat longer 
time to first corps command, it could indicate the greater crowding at the top is pushing people 
out a little bit more quickly. The Pakistan Army looks like a bureaucratic organization in which 
retirement rules usually bind. Moreover, the exceptions are easily explicable.  
Last Military Post before Retirement 
We also tentatively coded the last command held by a corps commander, or in the case of 
serving (as of February 2017) officers, the one currently held. To be clear: we lack systematic 
data on full career trajectories, so officers may very well have had a position in between their 
first command and their final command that we do not identify. Of those who are not in service 
and for whom we have data, Figure 7 summarizes their post at end of service (N=155). 
Figure 7. Roles at End of Service  
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Where do commanders go who do not retire when their first corps command ends?24 
Sixteen corps commanders moved to another corps command, including one who is currently 
serving, with Strategic Forces Command being the primary location (N=4); no other corps for 
which we have data gets more than two repeat commanders. Of these, eight retired as a corps 
commander and one is still serving as commander of Army Strategic Forces, four moved to a 
GHQ position, two to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), and 
one as head of the NDU.  
 That leaves 167 individuals who held a single corps command. Data on final commands 
are missing for 11 officers, while 15 single-corps commanders are currently serving. Of the one-
time corps commanders who have left service and about whom we have final command data 
(N=141), ten became Chief of Army Staff (COAS), three retired as DG ISI, seven ended service 
as CJCSC, 38 ended up in a GHQ staff position, eight took over an Army school, four became 
the head of a government agency, three became a martial law administrator, two headed an Army 
organization, and three held international roles (one ambassador, two at the UN). Because we 
also gathered ISI data, we know that two COASs and one CJCSC were DG ISI after their first 
corps command.  
A near-majority (N=63) of one-time commanders, consistent with our data on time to end 
of service, left service after their first corps command. Of the 38 who took a GHQ position, there 
is a cluster of 11 top staff slots for post-corps command elites: adjutant general (N=5), Chief of 
General Staff (N=4), Chief of Logistics Staff (N=5), DG Joint Staff (N=6), the now-defunct 
Deputy COAS (N=2) and Vice COAS (N=2), Inspector-General (IG) Arms (N=3), IG Training 
and Evaluation (N=4), Military Secretary (N=2), and Quartermaster General (N=3). Of the 17 
                                                
24 We can only measure these transitions at the level of the year, so some may do something for a few months after 
leaving their corps.  
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current/former corps commanders serving when data collection ended, one is on his second 
corps, one is DG ISI, ten are currently serving in their first corps command, one is COAS, one is 
CJCSC, and three are in GHQ (IG Training & Evaluation, Military Secretary, DG Joint Staff).  
There are some noteworthy, if tentative, patterns in who makes it up the command chain. 
First, Punjabi and Pashtun dominance continues. Only one of the ten Chiefs of Army Staff is not 
coded as one of these ethnic groups (he is a Muhajir, Musharraf). Of the ten CJCSC who came 
from the Army, we believe that one was a Muhajir (Shamim Alam Khan), two were Kashmiris, 
and the rest likely either Punjabi or Pashtun. Second, the infantry continues to lead the way: nine 
out of ten of Army CJCSCs and eight out of ten COASs come from the infantry. However, the 
other ranks at retirement are roughly proportional to the overall balance of sub-branches within 
the army: infantry is only dramatically over-represented at the very highest posts. Third, there 
may be overrepresentation of these top ranks by people who were in GHQ positions prior to their 
first corps command. Of the 20 top ranks, 11 had a GHQ slot, three were in charge of an Army 
educational institution, and only two had a GOC position as their jumping-off point into 
command. They almost all held a combat command earlier in their career, but moved into corps 
command from a staff position.  
This pattern of early staff positions is more pronounced than for the 45 officers who 
moved from a corps command to a GHQ slot but did not advance further: 11 were a GOC, 13 
had a GHQ staff position, with a smattering of other commands. Yet the same pattern that holds 
for the very top commands also holds for the commanders whose career ended after a single 
corps command: 27 had a GHQ slot, nine a command position, and the rest a variety of other 
roles prior to their command, missing data excepted. We end up with, if the data are right, a 
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curious mix of staff-heavy elites at the top and bottom of the distribution, with the in-between 
layer more broadly blending command and staff jumping-off points into corps command.  
 This analysis suggests several things about the internal workings of the Pakistan Army. 
First, the plurality of corps commanders end their careers after their first command. The age 
profile of those who take on high commands and leave service is remarkably consistent. Second, 
there is a clear set of high-prestige staff positions into which elites move after a corps command. 
These data provide a way of identifying the core power nodes of the military based on where the 
upwardly-mobile cluster after entering the elite. Third, the Army seems quite professionalized – 
the pyramid narrows, and most fall by the wayside. Those who do not retire move into an 
identifiable set of professionally demanding slots. 
Managing the Elite after Retirement 
Data on the Military Elite after Service 
Identifying the post-retirement fates of the military elite has been the most interesting empirical 
challenge and represents the most novel contribution of this paper. We coded the first post-
retirement position (both specific posts and broad categories). We also tried to measure post-
retirement roles following the first one, though the number of observations drops and patterns 
become difficult to identify. 
It is difficult to find evidence of absence; there are a few cases in which sources explicitly 
say officers retired entirely from activities, but in most cases of missing data we are uncertain 
about what happened. We nevertheless have surprisingly substantial data. English as Pakistan’s 
elite language and the military elites’ political importance have made these officers more visible 
than would likely be the case in many other contexts. 17 officers were still serving when data 
collection was completed and we know that at least two died in office. This leaves 164 possible 
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retirement trajectories to measure. 25 cases are missing, and we have some kind of data on 141 
corps commanders, or  85 percent of those retired from service. Table 4 lists the professional 
categories into which the non-currently-serving corps commanders for whom we have data. 
Table 4. Overall Distribution of Post-Service Outcomes 
First Post- Military Occupation Frequency Percent 
Fauji Company 33 23.4 
Ambassador 13 9 
Governor of a Province 10 7 
Head of Sports Organization 10 7 
Academic/Think Tank Work 9 6 
Federal Govt. Minister 9 6 
Defense Secretary 8 6 
Head of Federal Govt. Agency 7 5 
Head of School 6 4 
Head of NGO 5 4 
Head of Provincial Govt. Agency 5 4 
Founder, School/NGO 4 3 
Defense Analyst 3 2 
Author/Artist/Farmer/Preacher 2 1.4 
Died in service 2 1.4 
Head of Private Company 2 1.4 
Military Detention 2 1.4 
NGO Member 2 1.4 
Politics 2 1.4 
Company Work 1 0.7 
Founder, Company 1 0.7 
International Political/Military Advisor 1 0.7 
National Security Advisor 1 0.7 
Provincial Govt. Minister 1 0.7 
Total 141  
 
As we can see, the dominant post-retirement slot is into a blend of foundations and associated 
corporations we group together as “Fauji Companies.” These are almost entirely senior 
leadership positions, like board chairman and managing director.  This builds on Siddiqa’s 
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excellent monograph on the importance of the military’s involvement in Pakistan’s private sector 
economy.25  
 Preliminary analysis suggests that at any given time, around seven former corps 
commanders serve as either the managing directors of the Fauji Foundation or the Army Welfare 
Trust – who also serve as chairmen of the board of affiliated companies – or as managing 
directors of key enterprises, such as Mari Gas, Fauji Fertilizer, Fauji Cement, Askari Cement and 
Askari Bank. Personnel in these positions seem to change roughly every three years, providing 
opportunities for the newly retired. And while serving as an executive director is a well-
compensated position, it is both term-limited and dependent on competence in providing value 
for shareholders and stakeholders. This is not a path to independent oligarchic wealth. These 
foundations and related companies are also fairly professional: while many director and 
managerial positions are filled by retired officers from major generals to captains, there are also 
many civilians in leadership roles.  
  To be clear, there are also other aspects of the Pakistani economy in which the military is 
involved, notably the acquisition of land for the purposes of real estate, both to provide retiring 
officers with residential property and to participate in the lucrative property market in Pakistan. 
Retired officers often have more than one property, and selling or renting housing to civilians is 
a common practice, thus military officers and civilians commingle in most of the ostensibly 
military housing companies, which have become some of the most elite locations in urban 
Pakistan. The pyramidal structure of the Army is operative when it comes to land perks: after 15 
years of service, officers are entitled to one residential plot, after 25 a second, after 28 a third, 
                                                
25 Siddiqa 2007. In future research we will study this economic network in much greater detail, including 
corporations, welfare organizations, and land holdings. 
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and after 32 a fourth. The participation of senior military leadership in the political economy of 
real estate is an important area of further research. 
 Aside from economic and commercial positions, diplomatic appointments are also 
valued. A common practice in times of military rule, retired military personnel are often 
appointed to ambassadorships even under civilian governments. It is likely, however, that 
ambassadorships have lost some of their previous appeal as Pakistan’s economy has liberalized, 
with elites gaining access to consumer goods and opportunities abroad that had previously 
required official sanction through overseas postings. Moreover, key embassies and high 
commissions have a parallel structure for the representation of the military’s interests abroad, 
through the office of the military attache, which decreases the need for the ambassador to be 
from a military background for the military’s interests in foreign capitals to be maintained.  
Overall, the bulk of elites continue to be employed by the state or extensions of military-
affiliated civil society (87/141; 62 percent) even after leaving formal military service. The 
foundations, ambassadorships, the post of defence secretary (nominally the highest civilian 
bureaucrat in defence affairs), provincial and federal agencies, provincial governorships, and 
even federal cabinet appointments before 2008 are all ways retired elites have continued to be 
involved in governance. The military aims to provide its senior officers comfort and influence 
even in retirement. Interference in decision-making of current senior officers by retirees is 
looked upon extremely unfavorably; former Army chief Raheel Sharif, considered quite popular 
during his tenure, was even told to cease his organizing of social activities with serving generals 
after retirement. Yet they remain bound to the broader institution.  
 Strikingly, almost no one goes directly into politics after retirement. This is a contrast to 
contemporary India, where retired generals are now entering politics, and a huge difference from 
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Indonesia, with its plethora of retired-military politicians. The array of destinations for retired 
elites keeps them away from electoral politics – and also extends the influence of the military 
into domains that are reserved for civilians in other systems. There is, furthermore, a long-
cultivated cultural distaste for politicians among the military fraternity, and the geographic 
concentration of the military and military officers in garrisons and cantonments, with regular 
circulation, provides little opportunity to cultivate a geographic constituency required for 
electoral mobilization. For such a politically-involved military, its command elite have 
remarkably little directly to do with electoral politics after they retire.  
 The private sector is, at least initially, also not a popular destination. Though this 
becomes a more common pastime after the first retirement position (as we show below), the 
initial post-military phase is dominated by state employment of some variety. Other pursuits 
include running schools and NGOs, doing defense analysis, writing, farming, and advising 
foreign governments and multilateral organizations. Interestingly, none of the COAS or CJCSC 
have joined a fauji company and only one entered the private sector, suggesting these are mere 
fallback or “safety” options for the highest echelon.  
Trends by regime 
We wanted to see how destinations vary by the period in which officers left service. We roughly 
group service end periods into four, as above: the Zia era (1978-88), the “democratic decade” 
under Bhutto and Sharif (1989-1999), the Musharraf era (1999-2007), and the contemporary 
democratic period (2008-2017). There is some messiness around the end of the Zia and 
Musharraf eras, but almost all of these officers retired cleanly under one of the regimes.  
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Table 5. First Retirement Roles by Period/Regime (percentages in parentheses) 
Position  1978-88 1989-1998 1999-2007 2008-2017 
Fauji Company 1 (5) 9 (24) 9 (23) 14 (33) 
Province Governor 5 (26) 2 (5) 3 (7.5) 0 
Federal Govt. Minister 3 (16) 3 (8) 2 (5) 1 (2) 
Ambassador 4 (21) 0 4 (10) 4 (9.5) 
Head of Sports 
Organization 
0 3 (8) 4 (10) 3 (7) 
Head/Founder/Member of 
School or NGO 
1 (5) 5 (13) 8 (20) 5 (12) 
Electoral Politics 0 0 2 (5) 0 
Academic/Think tank 0 6 (16) 1 (2.5) 2 (5) 
Defence Secretary 0 1 (3) 1 (2.5) 5 (12) 
Head of Fed. Govt. 
Agency 
0 3 (8) 3 (7.5) 1 (2) 
Private Company 1 (5) 1 (3) 1 (2.5) 0 
Head of Provincial Govt. 
Agency 
1 (5) 0 1 (2.5) 3 (7) 
Other 3 (15) 6 (13) 1 (2.5) 4 (9.5)31 
Total 19 38 40 42 
 
 This is striking data: it is difficult to differentiate the Musharraf era of military rule from 
the two democratic decades around it. The military continues to put the same kinds of people in 
the same kinds of positions both when in formal power and out of it. If anything, there is 
evidence of new forms of military influence even after the withdrawal from power in 2007-8: 
there has been an increase in the number of retired corps commanders who have become 
Secretaries of Defence since 2008. Why does this matter? The Defence Secretary is supposed to 
be the top civilian bureaucrat in Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence. Yet since 2008, only one actual 
civilian, Nargis Sethi, has actually held this post, for about 7 months in 2012. The importance of 
this position lies not in its policy implications, as foreign and defense polic is de facto planned 
and executed at GHQ, not in the civilian bureaucracy. Rather, the position matters because any 
                                                
31 These four are interesting: 1 became National Security Advisor, 2 became Defence Analysts, and 1 became 
something he refers to as an International Political-Military Advisor (i.e. advising the UN).  
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removal or appointment of the army chief has to be approved by the Defence Secretary, thus 
providing the military with some checks on the civilian government’s power over appointments 
of army chief. Thus, even when not ruling, the military is able to put its just-retired personnel 
into positions of high civilian influence in defence (we do not see the same former military 
involvement in other sections of the federal bureaucracy).  
 There is a stark difference between the Zia era and the post-Zia era. Under Zia, it appears 
that the military was used more directly to govern: federal ministers and provincial governors 
formed a substantially higher percentage of the first retirement slots than after 1988. We cannot 
make general assumptions about how military regimes relate to civilian governance: Zia offered 
a more overtly “khaki” government than Musharraf, with the latter appointing only a few 
veterans in the federal government. The economic network surrounding the foundations really 
comes into its own following 1988; the percentage of retired elites going into Fauji companies 
shoots up and stays high across the three ensuing periods. 
This analysis also suggests that we should be careful making assumptions about obvious 
differences between civilian and military rule, which would predict much clearer differences 
between the Musharraf era and the democratic periods. Instead, while obviously much was 
different in macro-politics, the management of military elites looks almost identical across the 
post-1988 era. For those who do not go into government or a military corporation, being a retired 
senior officer opens up opportunities in the world of thinktanks, overseas fellowships, or the 
higher echelons of Pakistani civil society. One two-time corps commander and CJCSC founded 
the polo club at the Lahore garrison; another later reinvigorated and expanded it. The military 
elite’s post-service life chances are largely unaffected by whether the military is directly ruling.  
Deeper into Retirement 
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We also have data (N=89) on the most recent activity we can find retired elites doing after their 
first post-retirement post: this requires an individual moving into a new category, or moving 
between specific posts within a category. We go from 141 observations of post-retirement to 89, 
reflecting elites not finding a second job, dying, or the data being unavailable. This is therefore a 
hazy, but still illuminating, representation of retired senior officers several years out of service. 
Table 6 compares how the first retirement activity differs from later retirement positions.  
We see a substantially larger move into the private sector – this suggests, in alignment 
with qualitative evidence, that there is a period in which elites find other respectable things to do 
before making money. The particular activities in the private sector also worth noting. For those 
13 corps commanders that have ‘head of a private company’ as a final occupation post-
retirement, six were previous Fauji company executives, suggesting that these foundations are a 
gateway to broader opportunities in the private sector. The types of business they run are 
particular, however: largely either in similarly rent-rich public sector-adjacent activities, such as 
the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Coastal Refinery or Alphagas, with foreign 
multinationals such as Philip Morris or Nissan, or in managing military-associated service 
businesses such as in private security. None of these are allied with any of the powerful domestic 
corporate groups in Pakistan and thus maintain a level of insulation from civilian politics, even 
as they engage with the national economy. 
There is a substantially smaller share of elites who still hold government posts in their 
later retirement: 87 out of 141 (62 percent) work for the state in their first post-retirement 
position, while only 30 out of 88 (34 percent) do so later in the retirement. No one in our sample 
serves as secretary of defence in a later retirement position, making apparent how tight and 
immediate the pipeline is from military into the larger security bureaucracy. The recently retired 
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are a power resource for the military that likely decreases in effectiveness over time, as elites 
age, start to lose their connections to those serving, or get interested in new activities. Despite 
their connections to the state diminishing, they continue to be part of a broader elite social 
milieu, living in housing developments specifically intended for retired defense personnel, and 
frequenting elite clubs and golf courses. The private sector and NGO world became far more 
prominent in the later stages of retirement, while electoral politics rises a little but still remains 
remarkably small. 
Table 6. First vs. Most Recent Post-Retirement Rolee, percentages in parentheses 
 First Post- Military Last Post-Military 
Fauji Company 33 (23.4) 8 (9) 
Ambassador 13 (9) 6 (7) 
Governor of a Province 10 (7) 4 (5) 
Head of Sports Organization 10 (7) 2 (2) 
Academic/Think Tank Work 9 (6) 2 (2) 
Federal Govt. Minister 9 (6) 3 (3.4) 
Defense Secretary 8 (6) 0 
Head of Federal Govt. Agency 7 (5) 2 (2) 
Head of School 6 (4) 6 (7) 
Head of NGO 5 (4) 13 (15) 
Head of Provincial Govt. Agency 5 (4) 5 (6) 
Founder, School/NGO 4 (3)  
Defense Analyst 3 (2) 9 (10) 
Author/Artist/Farmer/Preacher 2 (1.4) 3 (3.4) 
Died in service 2 (1.4)  
Head of Private Company 2 (1.4) 13 (15) 
Military Detention 2 (1.4)  
NGO Member 2 (1.4) 3 (3.4) 
Politics 2 (1.4) 5 (6) 
Company Work 1 (0.7)  
Founder, Company 1 (0.7) 1 (1) 
International Political/Military 
Advisor 
1 (0.7)  
National Security Advisor 1 (0.7)  
Provincial Govt. Minister 1 (0.7)  
   
Total 141 88 
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A “State within a State”? Inter-Services Intelligence 
Since 1971, there have been 18 Directors-General (DGs) of ISI, the infamous intelligence 
organization.34 Though there have been a small number of accounts dedicated to the ISI, 
systematic evidence on the organization is quite scarce.35 Our data can only offer a limited 
perspective on this secretive organization, but does provide some interesting insights. The ISI is 
often described in near-mystical terms as a “state within a state,”36 possibly operating even 
outside the control of the Army. This is why we specifically gathered data on the Directors-
General of the ISI since 1971, including those who never held a corps command (according to 
our data, 8 of the 18 DGs ISI). 
The number of cases is small, and we proceed with caution. It is also crucial to note that 
selection as DG ISI is the prerogative of the Prime Minister in periods of civilian rule. Thus, 
under civilian rule this is not a purely military selection process, in contrast to most of the other 
positions discussed above. The termination of a DG’s position can also be highly political as 
premiers come and go, or as coups reshuffle the deck.  
What can we say about the ISI command elite? Like the broader set of military elites, this 
is primarily a Pashtun-Punjabi operation: ten were born in Punjab, two in KPK, two in Kashmir 
and one contemporary India (we lack data on three). We know that 9 of the 18 received foreign 
training. They are spread out more broadly across the sub-branches than the corps commanders: 
41 percent from the infantry, 23 percent from artillery, 18 percent from armour, and 18 percent 
from engineering and/or signals.  
                                                
34 Kiessling 2016 identifies 17, and then Naveed Mukhtar, previously commander of 5 Corps, took over as the 18th 
in late 2016. 
35 Kiessling 2016. 
36 For instance, Walsh 2009.  
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11 of the 18 DGs ISI held the ISI slot before a corps command, eight of whom never 
advanced to a corps command. Five of the 11 retired as DG ISI, two retired as corps 
commanders, one as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and three in GHQ 
positions (MG Ordnance, Adjutant General, IG Training and Evaluation). Of the seven DGs ISI 
who took the position after a corps command – particularly prevalent since the Musharraf years – 
 three retired as DG ISI, one as CJCS, and one is still serving. Two retired as COAS. Ashfaq 
Parvez Kayani is the only DG ISI to have become COAS under normal circumstances; Khwaja 
Ziauddin was extremely briefly tapped to be COAS by Nawaz Sharif in his effort to get rid of 
Pervez Musharraf, but he was put under military detention once Musharraf seized power in the 
1999 coup. This is an important position, but one in which a plurality of DGs ISI retire from the 
position, just like first corps commands.  
Though obviously ultimately determined by a political decision, the basic professional 
qualifications of DGs ISI appear very similar to elevation to the other elite ranks of the military, 
particularly in the more recent past. Of ten DGs ISI since 1995, all but three either were 
appointed after corps command or left ISI for a corps command. Of these exceptions, the first 
went from a divisional command to ordnance chief at GHQ via ISI and became defence secretary 
upon retirement, the second served as DG Military Operations before ISI, and the third, the 
currently serving DG ISI, previously served as the DG Sindh Rangers, responsible for the 
paramilitary response to urban violence in Karachi. 
What does this mean? The ISI seems to be deeply integrated into the Army, a standard 
command for a variety of types of officers despite its political importance, though there is a clear 
bias toward those with previous intelligence experience, with eight serving as the Director-
General of Military Intelligence or having previous ISI experience before appointment. The non-
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intelligence specialists had similar professional backgrounds as the corps commanders, ranging 
from commanding a division to managing logistics to directing paramilitaries. While the ISI was 
the final post for just under half of those we have data on, the rest moved into other senior posts 
in the military once they finished their ISI posting, including corps commands, key positions at 
GHQ, and CJCSC.  
We see this relative normalcy in the data on retirement as well: the ISI does not seem to 
generate a distinctive set of post-retirement trajectories. One died in office and we lack data on 
four others, so our N is only 13. Of these, two became Defence Secretary, one became an 
ambassador, one became President of the NDU, one became head of a military company, one 
became a federal minister and another head of a federal agency, and the rest were an assorted 
mix of authors, executives, think-tankers, and the president of the Pakistan Golf Federation. 
 To the extent that we can draw conclusions from this limited data, it seriously 
complicates claims of ISI exceptionalism or “rogueness.” The ISI leadership is part of a highly 
cohesive military organization, staffed at the top by the same kind of senior officers who 
command the rest of the Army. It is neither a clear stepping stone to the top, nor an irrelevant 
dead-end. While it is biased toward intelligence specialists, it is not restricted to them. At least at 
its top the ISI can only be considered an integrated part of the Pakistan Army and highly aligned 
with the rest of the military elite. Even with prime ministerial discretion over selecting and 
managing its DG, the ISI remains the Army.  
Conclusion 
This paper provides insights into how the Pakistani army maintains cohesion and influence 
amidst deep political involvement. Using unique data, we show that the Pakistan Army has 
managed to maintain professional internal processes while using retired personnel to help carve 
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out dramatic political influence in the political system. This suggests a new way of looking at 
civil-military relations and politically active militaries that focuses less on the strategic 
interactions between civilian and military elites and more on the ways that militaries can 
combine internal organization with external political power. We have highlighted data 
limitations throughout, but this empirical work provides a foundation for new ways of studying 
Pakistan’s military politics. 
 Future research can build on these insights. First, more complete and extensive data will 
provide valuable detail on the military elites’ backgrounds and career trajectories. This includes 
forward-looking data on the current command elite. We are pursuing these tasks in ongoing 
work. Second, the puzzle emerges of why Pakistan’s Army has been able to build a “military 
enclave,”40 even while many other political militaries have fractured internally or been sidelined 
from politics. Cross-national comparisons with politically-involved militaries – such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, and Chile - will be essential for answering this question. 
Third, we may need to re-think standard distinctions between military and civilian rule so 
common in studies of political regimes. Pakistan’s military has not given up control of key 
policy areas even when withdrawing from power, and this influence is sometimes accomplished 
through informal practices rather than formal pacts.41 Finally, more research on “Military Inc.”42 
can provide new information about the networks of economic influence that the military has 
constructed, and how they relate to its political project.  
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